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BOOK REVIEW
Digital Television History: "Take
One"
Defining Vision: The Battle for the Future of
Television, by Joel Brinkley, Harcourt Brace and
Company, 1997,402 pages.
Reviewed by Herbert A. Terry*
How the United States ended up with digital television when it set
out to develop high-definition television (HDTV) is a complex story. Fu-
ture historians will understand the story differently, and more thoroughly,
than we understand it today. Joel Brindey's journalistic account will be an
important starting point for those future interpretations of the development
of digital television.
Brindey's story is not always pretty. It is heavy on the impact of in-
dividual egos and corporate self-interest. If his account is right, the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters's (NAB) initiative to replace National
Television Standards Committee (NTSC) television with HDTV began as
no more than a cynical spectrum grab aimed at defeating a nearly-
accomplished Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion) transfer of unused UHF spectrum to land mobile radio in 1986. To
block the transfer, broadcasters promised to bring the public sharp, wide-
screen television with dramatically enhanced sound if the FCC kept the
spectrum from land mobile. At that point, broadcasters neither knew nor
cared if HDTV was possible. They had hardly thought through the pro-
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found and costly effects of HDTV on their industry if they got what they
wanted. Spectrum protectionism was far more important than bringing the
public the best broadcast service in the world, despite public posturing to
the contrary by those in the industry.
Most who have attentively followed the HDTV/digital wars know
Brindey's basic story line. Japan (with Multiple Subnyquist Sampling En-
coding (MUSE)) starts out far ahead. HDTV initiatives in the U.S. have a
share of economic as well as spectrum protectionism. As competing sys-
tems are developed by several companies, it becomes clear that in order to
fit the information-rich HDTV signal into a small, 6 MhZ spectrum pipe
allocated by the FCC, the signal must be digital rather than analog. But the
switch to digital stretches the technical ability of the competing companies
to their limits and, in the end, no company produces a clearly superior
system. A composite system, a "Grand Alliance," emerges and eventually
gains FCC support.
Unfortunately, the move to digital undermines the economics of de-
veloping HDTV at all. Why would a sane broadcaster spend millions only
to end up with a costly, but still single-channel, delivery system with little-
enhanced revenue-generating potential? Why not exploit the possibilities
digital provides, such as the multicasting of less-than-HDTV pictures and
nonbroadcast services?
Care is required in moving in this direction, however, because Con-
gress (and maybe even the public) believed broadcasters' promises of their
intent and desire to develop HDTV. Failing to develop HDTV could result
in Congress charging broadcasters for spectrum space they thought they
would get for free. But careful maneuvering appears, for the moment, to
allow broadcasters to avoid paying for spectrum and still keep open all of
their technological options.
While there is not much new about the already well-known "big pic-
ture" in Brinkley's account, he does offer wonderful detail at very personal
levels. His cogent and often acerbic account is, primarily, the story of the
personalities-both individual and corporate-behind the digital wars.
His opening part, "The Scheme," outlines HDTV's cynical birth.
Then NAB Vice President John Abel was the scheme's creator--the man
who thought up the ploy of asking for HDTV in order to block land mo-
bile. But HDTV, Abel soon discovered, was beyond contemporary U.S.
broadcast technology. So, according to Brinkley, the NAB and its allies
enlisted the aid of Japan's public broadcasting network, NHK, with its at
least demonstrable MUSE analog system, to show that HDTV was possi-
ble. The NAB failed to inform their Asian counterparts that the MUSE
demonstrations were political ruses to defeat land mobile and not, in fact, a
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true expression of U.S. broadcaster interest. To the surprise of the NAB,
what really made the initiative work, and led the FCC to withhold the
spectrum from land mobile, was not the quality of the pictures MUSE de-
livered but rather Congressional hostility to the idea that those beautiful
pictures might have resulted from Japanese rather than U.S. technology.
Part two of Brindey's work, "The Players," is the book's best. Here
he portrays the major companies and individuals who, eventually, brought
HDTV/digital television proposals to the Advanced Television Service
Committee (ATSC) for testing. RCA/Sarnoff Labs comes across as a
proud, but declining, system developer that not only failed to recognize
that it no longer had any God- (or Sarnoff-) given right to lead the U.S.
broadcast innovation, but also seemed incapable of understanding why it
was regarded as "foreign" even though it partnered with Thomson (French)
and Phillips (Dutch). Zenith, by then in even deeper economic and creative
decline than RCAISarnoff, had good ideas but lacked the resources to de-
velop them. In the end, Zenith was encumbered by an inability to work ef-
fectively with its nonbroadcast-experienced partner, AT&T/Bell Labs.
One theme of Brindey's account is that broadcast experience alone is
not enough for the digital age-that, like it or not, insights from the space
program, from military contract work, from cable television, and from
Silicon Valley are necessary to solve the HDTV/digital puzzle. While
broadcast engineers claimed digital television was "impossible," Korean-
American Woo Paik, working for VideoCipher (ultimately General In-
strument) in "isolated" San Diego, simply went to the corporate basement
and made it work.
Egos-corporate and individual-figure big in Brindey's story. At
times they threatened to bring everything down, but the day was often
saved by a few legal and/or technological statesmen. MIT's "Grand Vi-
zier" Nicholas Negroponte had the proper digital vision early on, and this
vision worked its way into the systems proposed by NIT and General In-
strument. But Negroponte ultimately clashed with Richard Wiley, the head
of the advisory committee that a perhaps cynical FCC created to evaluate
alternative HDTV systems and make standards recommendations.
Brindey's clearest hero is Wiley. He comes across as a focused and unbi-
ased leader genuinely interested in seeing HDTV (and eventually digital)
through despite the roadblocks thrown up by the industrial players, Con-
gress, and even the FCC (to which his committee reports). CBS's Joe Fla-
herty also could have been counted as a voice of reason when the bickering
of other players threatened to unravel everything. Peter Fannon insisted
upon the integrity of tests conducted by his Advanced Television Test
Center. Near the end of the story, Joe Donahue (of Sarnoff) and Bob Rast
(of General Instrument) compromised the interests of their principals in
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order to hold the Grand Alliance together in the face of late broadcaster
opposition and indifference or indirection from Reed Hundt, under whose
watch digital standards were finally adopted.
Part three of the book, "Tests," chronicles the chaos surrounding ef-
forts to complete prototypes for testing at the Advanced Television Test
Center and the delays, backbiting, and fudging, if not outright cheating,
entangling the testing process. Brinkley's account suggests that the Grand
Alliance system, although created by the parties to bring competition to a
close and move forward, was not just another cynical compromise but, in-
stead, was a much better system than any of the parties could have devel-
oped independently. It is, however, also a scary account if one believes
that America's leading-edge communications technology companies
should be able to make realistic promises, meet deadlines, and at least oc-
casionally seek to solve problems with the public interest in mind.
The fourth part of the book, "Politics," reviews both the internal cor-
porate politics of the Grand Alliance--delicately working out who would
make what once a common system was proposed-and the last-minute real
politics of HDTV/digital after Congress realized that billions of dollars
could be applied to the deficit if broadcasters, like others, were brought
into spectrum auctions or forced to pay directly for spectrum space. Ac-
cording to Brinkley, broadcaster cynicism returns and, despite substantial
disinterest in really developing HDTV because of its costs and uncertain
revenue potential, leads broadcasters to give the impression, if not the out-
right promise, that HDTV will be deployed if Congress continues to pro-
vide transition spectrum without charge. The book concludes with an epi-
logue that takes the story through mid-1996 when two experimental HDTV
stations-WRC and WRAL-finally made it on the air to begin testing
HDTV systems.
Future historians will likely enhance Brindey's account in several
ways. The book is at its best when it deals with technologists, engineers,
and those corporate executives who managed each company's participa-
tion in the HDTV/digital system development process. But some grander
parts of the business history of digital seem to be missing. Except for his
descriptions of Zenith, one could get a sense that the highest management
levels of the involved companies rarely intervened in what was going on.
But, given the speculation that total corporate investment in HDTV/digital
has approached 500 million dollars, that hardly seems likely. It is the sort
of thing, however, that is much harder to get a handle on at present than
the kind of legal and technological information Brinkley marshals admira-
bly. His account seems similarly incomplete when it comes to explaining
the internal workings of the FCC and the involvement of Congress.
Brindey focuses his attention on several FCC chairs, but leaves out the
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important roles played by FCC staff and other commissioners. Little is in-
cluded about Congress or the FCC that is not already well known from
trade press accounts. While there is more to learn about congressional and
FCC involvement, Brindey's focus is the technologists, lobbyists, and
lawyers in the trenches who made HDTV happen.
Near the end of the book, Brinkley addresses the seemingly last-
minute interest of the computer industry in the advanced television pro-
ceedings. Brinkley sheds light on the disputes between computer propo-
nents of progressive scanning and broadcaster proponents of interleaved
scanning. He also provides nontechnical explanations of the significance
of packetizing, interoperability, and the role of compression alternatives in
the evolution of digital technology. Brinkley argues that the computer
folks were disadvantaged because Chairman Patrick deliberately filled the
initial ATSC with broadcasters. However, he never fully explains why they
waited as long as they did before finally, forcefully intervening in some-
thing so dear to their interests as millions of new digital display devices in
homes and businesses.
Like most journalistic accounts, this is instant history-and very
good instant history at that. Brinkley's account is not the whole story of
HDTV/digital and, of course, the story is not over. As his telling shows,
however, the path to the next generation of television (or television com-
bined with computing) has hardly been straight and it would be folly, to-
day, to believe that the course is now clear. But those who want to under-
stand how we got where we are today are well served by Brinkley's
account.
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